Security, Defense Discourse and Identity in NATO and Europe: How France Changed Foreign Policy by Falk Ostermann

Author:Falk Ostermann [Ostermann, Falk]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Political Science, General, History & Theory
ISBN: 9781138585409
Google: hQtpDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 39231033
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-08-02T00:00:00+00:00

3.2 Franco-American relations resignified?!

As during the 1990s, performances of Franco-American relations and of the American role in the world are fundamentally diverging between the right and left wings of parliament, and especially so on the Radical Left. They carry a considerable explanatory burden for the support or rejection of NATO reintegration, but also influence concepts of European integration, as we will see later.

Especially on the Radical Left, the critique of U.S. foreign policy remains principled. It reaches from accusations about global hegemony and imperialism over the lenient use of force (militariste, guerre préventive) up to the overall U.S. position in Europe (e.g., Asensi, PCF, AN 2009–03–17; Mélenchon, PG, Sénat 2009–03–17). These performances are thus saturated with negative frames we have already witnessed in Chapter 2. With a look at the war on terror, especially the outgoing Bush administration could not be trusted. Thus, the discursive performance of the U.S. as social, political, and economic other of France can still be found in many facets, and this the stronger the more one approaches the radical-left wing of parliament. The anti-imperialist fighter for egalitarianism, the agent for peace, and sometimes even the pacifist are the subject positions from which the Radical Left speaks. Therefore, the political logic is one that clearly marks differences in culture, values, and policies between France and the U.S. For the Communists, U.S. foreign policy is simply driven by economic preferences. The Green Mamère (EELV) goes as far as calling Afghanistan an American “training camp” (AN 2008–09–22). In the fantasmatic logic behind these statements, the representation of the U.S. as the dominant power in the world is therefore often related to aggressive behavior, hegemonic interventionism, unilateralism, and self-interest (Lecoq, PCF, AN 2008–06–26; Boucheron, PS, AN 2008–11–07; Demessine, PCF, Sénat 2009–03–25). Hence, it uses a multitude of negative names and concepts of both scholarly but also commonplace character.

The Socialists’ critique of the U.S. is mostly more nuanced than the one of the Radical Left. Often, it is specifically directed against the Bush Jr. years and their dominant neoconservatism. Therefore, Socialists express hope that things might change with Obama (Bel, PS, Sénat 2007–09–18; Carrère, PS, Sénat 2008–05–14; Fillon, PM, AN 2009–03–17). As Obama was only in office for the last ten weeks of the investigated period, the rather positive and welcoming attitude toward him does not yet travel to explicit policy endorsements (Hollande, PS, AN 2008–04–08; de Rugy, EELV, AN 2009–01–28). Sometimes, the U.S. is indeed recognized as an important ally whom the French have many policy disagreements with (Boulaud, PS, Sénat 2008–06–17). Therefore, the subject position in PS statements subscribes more to something like a critical friend than a fervent adversary. The statements do not distinguish as strictly between the Americans and the French as radical-left ones do. Hence, the Socialists do not construct the U.S. as other as strongly as the Radical Left does. This more positive assessment of the U.S. is not reason enough to support reintegration, but the Communists’ basic anti-Americanism counterfactually explains why the Socialists can approve of cooperation with the Americans and within NATO within limits.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.